of Eastern Europe 5 and latin america. the notion is so pervasive that even dissenters from the conventional wisdom despair of the prospects for democratization when they find the middle classes in the societies they study to be "anxious" and "dependent." 6 that the existence of a relatively large, moderating middle stratum is conducive to the emergence of democracy is a proposition as old as aristotle. What gives the idea its contemporary currency is the rapid expansion of a propertyless urban middle stratum characterizing modern capitalist development. 7 as the recent wave of political liberalizations had coincided with its growing prominence, "the middle class, as a rising and visible social force, is then given a 'political mission' to fulfill during this unprecedented political transition."
8 the argument then invokes certain common assumptions about the high correlation between educational attainment and income level, on the one hand, and support for democracy, on the other, 9 sometimes with a highlight on postmaterialist values. One updated variant of this thesis, for example, emphasizes the role of the middle class as the primary torchbearers of revivalist nationalist movements-said to be a major impetus behind the fall of authoritarian regimes from the former soviet Union to taiwan. the continuing fascination with the "historical mission" of one social class or another is perhaps a testament to the lasting impact of the Marxian legacy. But just as the proletarians of the world have often proved to be reluctant heroes, historically the prodemocratic credentials of the middle class have been far from unimpeachable. Fascism has been famously characterized as a form of "extremism of the center"; 10 and as huntington acknowledged, 11 the middle class was instrumental in the consolidation of authoritarian regimes from the southern Cone to the iberian Peninsula. huntington attributed this ambivalence to the numerical weakness and political insecurity of middle-class groups in the early stages of capitalist development. Following a Downsian paradigm, 12 he argued that with advanced industrialization, the middle class would gradually increase in size relative to both urban labor and the peasantry, thus gaining greater confidence in its ability to defend its interests in electoral politics. the trouble with this account is that in itself, it would merely provide one necessary condition for middle-class acquiescence to democratization. to explain active support, one must also assume that the new middle class is the social carrier of liberal, prodemocratic values and that subscribing to such values would ultimately translate into consistent political action. But as Chang Mau-Kuei observes, 13 many of the arguments about the role of the middle class were derived from the historical experience of nineteenth-century Europe, where a relatively open public sphere afforded "civil society" a fair amount of autonomy and political influence. in developing countries where authoritarian regimes had long kept civil society under heavy statist thumbs, where the middle class had often been dependent on the state, it is not clear what role the new middle class could have played. Furthermore, that the "middle class" is an intermediate social structure with fluid boundaries and heterogeneous interests and beliefs has been one of the few points of agreement between neo-Weberian and Marxian social analyses.
14 and if the concept is fuzzy even in advanced capitalist societies with mature stratification structures, then in the developing societies affected by the third wave, the boundary issue is likely to be especially acute due to the rapidity and fluidity of socioeconomic transformations.
any class-based account of regime transition must therefore rest upon two empirical research questions: the question of class boundaries and the question of class positions. Class remains relevant because politics remains profoundly socially embedded: over the past few decades a wealth of empirical evidence has accumulated demonstrating the heavy influence exerted by community and family networks on individual political behavior. 15 But a politically relevant conceptualization of class must be able to capture these natural social networks between people and lend itself to be the natural building bloc of collective political action. it is therefore the realities of practical politics that define for us the relevant conceptualization of class, defined along the dimensions of work, income, status, and lifestyle. "Class" in this sense is not a specific entity-the sort of bounded schumpeterian "conveyance" with a publicly recognized identity collecting and discharging individual members with the regularity of a streetcar. instead, class in this sense is defined by the commonality of lifestyles, values, and closure of life chances as rooted in the family experience. 16 Class thus defined constitutes a "natural community" to the extent that it is by definition made up of actors bound together by a (usually) unarticulated but implicit sense of mutual belonging. 17 however, it bears emphasizing that class in this sense cannot be delineated a priori based on abstract theory; nor is its manifestation limited to associations of the workplace. an exclusive focus on traditional workplace organizations risks missing the significant class component underlying a great variety of political phenomena.
in this article i offer a counterconventional account of taiwan's transition to democracy, based upon an empirically derived neo-Weberian class-analytic framework. among the newly democratized countries of the third wave taiwan enjoys a widespread reputation as one of the purest examples of middle-class-driven democratization. it was one of the few examples in which the transition took place at the height of economic prosperity. Unlike most cases in latin america, southern Europe, or elsewhere in asia, where powerful labor movements destabilized and delegitimized authoritarian rule, 18 organized labor in taiwan never broke free from state control and the few attempts at independent labor mobilization were abject failures. small wonder that taiwan was referred to approvingly as "the best working example of the theory that economic progress should bring in its wake democratic inclinations and a healthy surge of pluralism,"
19 a phenomenon largely credited to the rapid expansion of the middle class. likewise huntington regarded taiwan as a prime example of elite-led "transformation" spurred on by participatory demands from an activist middle class, 20 while Doh C. shin attributed taiwan's transition to the spread of postmaterialist values among the island's better-educated citizens. 21 My analysis suggests that the conventional accent on the middle class is largely misplaced. While the better-educated middle classes may display great enthusiasm for democratic principles in the abstract, as the primary beneficiaries of the state they were also among the most 16 politically conservative sectors in society. instead, the true heroes in the struggle for democracy, even in prosperous, placid taiwan, were the island's urban and rural working classes, although proper recognition of this fact requires us to look beyond the politics of the workplace. indeed, most recent works on the role of the working class in democratization have tended to insist on the organization of "labor qua labor," with the discussion generally focusing on labor unions at the expense of other class-based movements. this is the approach taken by Rueschemeyer, stephens, and stephens, for instance, who lauded the south Korean working class for putting democracy "forcefully on the agenda," while lamenting the prospects for democratization in taiwan (and elsewhere in East asia) because it lacked a powerful labor movement. 22 however, the role of the working class as a social sector should not be conflated with the role of labor unions. and as i will demonstrate, the taiwanese case illustrates how a variety of political phenomena seemingly unrelated to class are in fact undergirded by a fundamental class component. in another common interpretation taiwan's transition is seen as the expression of a resurgent taiwanese ethnic identity, said either to crosscut class divisions or to be carried primarily by the middle-class intelligentsia. 23 Certainly, from the mid-1980s onward ethnic rhetoric has been an increasingly important component of the opposition's mobilizational strategy, and the opposition movement is often seen as a movement of the native taiwanese. nonetheless, although i do not dispute the importance of ethnicity, i believe that it is essential to bear in mind that ethnic divisions alone cannot account for variations in regime support among native taiwanese, who make up 85 percent of the population. 24 instead, my findings clearly show that ethnic identity was in itself a class issue, as the island's urban and rural working classes were the most deeply attached to a nativist taiwanese identity, whereas better educated, wealthier members of the middle classes were far more successfully assimilated into the official high culture. But exactly because the opposition's working-class base was also the most responsive to ethnic mobilization, the opposition was able to replace class rhetoric with ethnic rhetoric when it became politically advantageous to do so. 24 the "native taiwanese" in our discussion refer to the descendants of han Chinese migrants who colonized the island a few centuries earlier, mostly from Fujian Province on the mainland. Culturally and ethnically, they continue to have much in common with the people of southern Fujian. 25 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 371.
political impact … without some means of linking social interests to nationalist objectives," then it may be argued that it was the class characteristics of the opposition's support base which enabled the opposition's ethnic agenda. the broad overlap between the appeals of ethnic and social discontent is by no means unique to taiwan. From Finland to georgia to the sea of galilee, ethnic/nationalist articulations have been taken up time and again by essentially class-based parties.
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For the theory of democratization the key lessons from the taiwanese experience are twofold. First, the struggle for democracy is essentially a struggle for inclusion by the marginalized sectors of society. While the better-educated "new" middle classes may embrace liberal democratic principles in the abstract, their support for democracy is contingent and tends to recede when political instability threatens their vested economic interests. thus the impetus for democratization, even in successful, "developmental" authoritarian states (and perhaps especially in successful "developmental" authoritarian states), has to be located among the popular classes-consisting of the urban and rural working classes as well as the entrepreneurial self-employed. second, underlying many political movements apparently driven by ethnic, nationalist, or sectarian mobilization is a significant class component, all the more so where multiple social cleavages coincide, although class in this sense is defined by the social relations of power rather than the economic relations of production.
27 students of class politics should therefore bear in mind that class can be experienced and expressed in many ways and in many places, and they should be alert to its many manifestations beyond the workplace.
the transition in taiwan
Bearing in mind the theoretical observations outlined above, i now attempt a reevaluation of the role of class in taiwan's transition to democracy. the taiwanese case, of course, is of special interest to students of East asia as a useful mirror for the political development of its neighbors, China in particular. But its significance for the theory 26 Eric hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 124.
27 it should be noted that the concept of class employed here is neo-Weberian and is related to but differs from the Weberian concept of "status group." Weber, writing in an era when the traditional aristocratic elite still retained significant social influence, employed the concepts of "status group" and "class" to differentiate between alternative sources of social power-one based on prestige and the other based on control of economic resources. in modern societies, however, control over resources and the command of social prestige have become increasingly intertwined. the neo-Weberian concept of class reflects this reality.
of democratization lies in its unique character as one of the very few examples of transition in the midst of prosperity, where authoritarian rule retreated at the peak of unprecedented growth and apparent political stability. at the time the transition began in the mid-1980s, the KuoMintang (kmt) regime in taiwan was a quasi-leninist regime organized along leninist lines with deep party penetration into every segment of the government, the military, and society, with the apex of the party-state dominated by a small elite of mainlanders who retreated to taiwan some four decades earlier ruling over a population that was 85 percent native taiwanese.
28 the ideology of the regime rested on the triple pillars of anticommunism, pro-Western developmentalism, and Chinese nationalism. like other conquering émigré regimes, the kmt state systematically suppressed local taiwanese dialects and folk culture while upholding the Mandarin traditions of the ruling elite as the "national" high culture. standard Mandarin was imposed as the language of official communications, education, and the mass media; and various penalties ranging from fines to spankings were prescribed for using taiwanese dialects in schools.
29 thus both politically and ideologically taiwanese society in the authoritarian era was characterized by the domination of the mainlander elite over the majority native taiwanese, in what Donald horowitz would characterize as a "ranked ethnic system." 30 nonetheless, the taiwanese did enjoy an equality of sorts under kmt rule. although access to the highest circles of power was jealously guarded, there were opportunities for upward mobility for native taiwanese, including even the politically ambitious. Partly to bolster its standing in the camp of "free nations," the regime had held direct elections at the local level since the 1950s, although the offices open to competition generally held little power. as characteristic of "ranked ethnic systems," 31 such mechanisms of local leadership selection were always carefully controlled to ensure that only those willing to accept the regime's ideology were admitted to the halls of power. For dissidents unwilling to toe the party line, political persecution was also "equal," applied without regard for provincial origins.
Meanwhile, the export-driven economic boom of the 1970s had given birth to a new commercial sector relatively independent of the 28 party-state. as the regime avoided picking "national champions," the economy came to be dominated by small to medium-size enterprises having sufficient resources to maintain a significant level of autonomy yet numerous enough to avoid direct confrontation with the state. it is worth noting here that although economic resources were diffused, they were largely controlled by native taiwanese. the conventional wisdom on the island was that while the mainlanders tended to have higherstatus government jobs, the taiwanese had greater income and wealth. the result was an equilibrium of sorts, with mainlanders dominating high politics and the taiwanese taking the lead in the economy.
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against this backdrop, a new political opposition announced its arrival in the elections of 1977, when candidates under the Dang-wai (literally, outside the Party) banner captured twenty-two seats in the provincial assembly and won four executive races. Due to the ban on new parties, the opposition operated as a loose confederation based largely on personalities and local issues but drawn together by a common disaffection with the kmt. although the opposition mainstream generally favored moderate parliamentarism, a radical minority never abandoned more militant tactics, even after an antigovernment riot in 1979 resulted in the incarceration of almost the entire opposition leadership. thus the taiwanese political landscape of the early 1980s was one full of contradictions-brutal if highly selective repression against individual dissidents existed side by side with an unprecedented permissiveness that saw the growth of an increasingly savvy and vocal opposition, as well as various middle-class social movements (feminist, environmental, and so on). nonetheless, one should not underestimate the amount of popular support commanded by the kmt. there was genuine appreciation for the economic achievements of the regime, and discontent with authoritarian rule, though present, was limited to a minority. 33 the kmt continued to enjoy considerable electoral success, winning sixty-two out of seventy-one open seats in the legislative elections of 1983.
the Rubicon of taiwan's transition to democracy was crossed in 1986, when-ahead of yet another legislative election-the opposition announced the formal formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (dpp) in direct contravention of the long-standing ban on opposition parties. all eyes were turned to President Chiang Ching-Kuo, as the move represented the opposition's most serious challenge to the martial law regime. after intense debates within the top leadership, Chiang gave his tacit consent to the new party and subsequently lifted some four decades of martial law, paving the way for a series of further reforms that ultimately culminated in the direct elections of the national legislature and the presidency.
Chiang's move, in the words of a taiwanese colleague, can be likened to the "unlocking of the deadbolt." though it by no means flung open the doors to democratic politics, it did allow a boisterous civil society to blossom almost overnight.
34 the party-state thus found itself suddenly exposed and vulnerable to all sorts of societal pressures as never before, pressures that Chiang's successor-President lee tenghui-adroitly exploited as he consolidated his power against the party old guard. given the topography of intraparty factional alignments, it is perhaps not surprising that lee, as the first native president of the island, should have assumed the mantle of the democratic reformer to outmaneuver his mainlander rivals. What is more intriguing is why Chiang chose to lift martial law when he did.
although admirers of the late president often attribute the decision to Chiang's democratic inclinations, in reality Chiang was at best a reluctant reformer. indeed, up to the end of his life in 1988 Chiang often confided to his close associates that he did not believe multiparty politics would be good for taiwan. 35 an alternative interpretation emphasizes the security threat faced by the Chiang regime in the wake of U.s. derecognition, as well as mounting pressure from the mainland. But although the security threats were real, especially in the long run, their imminence should not be exaggerated. Public sentiment on the island certainly did not favor reunification under the PRC's formula; if anything a kmt "sellout" was one of the opposition's great fears. 36 likewise, though the U.s. had pledged to reduce arms sales to taiwan in the shanghai Communiqué of 1982, the administration then moved quickly to issue a six-point assurance to taipei, promising american support to maintain the status quo. Reagan himself assured members of the press that "our taiwan friends are going to continue to get every- 34 38 after all, by 1986 taiwanese trade with america had reached $26.8 billion, and it was unlikely that the U.s. would jeopardize the security of its sixth largest trading partner. although the kmt's american critics such as Congressmen Jim leach and stephen solarz were tireless in their efforts to expose the regime's human rights abuses, they were also-in the words of leach-"very much alone." the "taiwan lobby" in Congress remained powerful and continued to "advocate whatever the taiwanese government would advocate." 39 nonetheless, the campaign waged by leach and his colleagues did serve as a warning shot across the bow, and motions such as the solarz amendment to the arms Export Control act (which banned arms export to any country engaged in "intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United states") sent a clear signal to taipei that excessive repression of political dissent carried serious security consequences. But american pressure on human rights issues served primarily as a constraint on the range of options available to the regime. Certainly a dozen or so nonbinding resolutions sponsored by a few maverick legislators would not have persuaded Chiang to lift martial law had there not been vigorous domestic pressure for reforms. however, the regime's growing diplomatic isolation as well as the international spotlight on its human rights record did embolden the regime's opponents; and as Chao and Myers observed, their "relentless challenge to organize a political party" proved to be "the greatest pressure on the kmt."
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it was an all-or-nothing gambit. hard-liners in the kmt clamored for a crackdown; for Chiang the decision came down to whether a crackdown would calm the waters or merely create more turmoil. 41 although the opposition faced certain defeat in any direct confrontation against the full force of the regime, the consistency of the popular support it commanded, despite a string of high-profile imprisonments and political murders in the early 1980s, was said to have impressed Chiang and many of his advisers deeply. 42 in the end the regime simply did not have the stomach to risk a showdown against one-quarter of the population and incur international condemnation, and Chiang chose to dismantle the martial law regime in order to defuse the crisis. By taking the initiative he hoped the party could at least control the reform agenda and contain the opposition; the alternative would have entailed unacceptable risk of social unrest.
indeed, when queried about the subject a decade later, kmt leaders familiar with the events concurred that "[the wish] to avoid serious confrontation with society" was the top specific factor behind Chiang's initiation of political reforms. 42 in that sense reform was a choice forced upon Chiang by the very tenacity of the opposition movement, facilitated though it was by the international environment. and it is also in that sense that the opposition can be credited as the impetus behind taiwan's transition. Ultimately it was the opposition's mass support base, diffused but loyal, that protected the fledgling movement from the wrath of the party-state and gave it credibility in the electoral arena-credibility that, as shelley Rigger pointed out, became the single most important asset with which the opposition could extract concessions from the regime. 44 taiwanese society on the eve of transition Understanding the social base of the opposition movement is therefore essential to understanding the impetus behind taiwan's transition. if taiwan's democratization was driven by the "relentless challenge" from the opposition, then ultimately what drove the transition were the social pressures that sustained the opposition. absent the economic disasters and military catastrophes that triggered regime collapse elsewhere, scholars seek explanation in cultural factors such as the growing prevalence of postmaterialist values and democratic inclinations, 45 as well as the resurgence of taiwanese nationalist articulations. as the social carrier of these new consciousnesses is generally assumed to be the new urban middle class, taiwan is often regarded as a paradigmatic case of middle-class-driven democratization.
But as i argued earlier, a meaningful discussion of class positions must be predicated upon the answer to a logically prior question, that 42 of class boundaries; and that is an empirical question specified by particularities peculiar to each concrete historical scenario. Consider, for example, the degree of differentiation between the urban working class and the so-called petite bourgeoisie. We know from numerous case studies that in most developing societies, the two are often no more than different phases within the same individual's career. 46 Wage labor is usually considered temporary and the two groups generally move in the same social circles. similarly, although in Western societies lowlevel white-collar workers are often considered to be in the same class as industrial labor, in developing societies even the relatively modest educational credentials necessary for a clerical career tend to be in short supply, thus endowing low-level office workers with a higher status than they enjoy in Western societies. 47 to explore these and other questions requires a social classification scheme designed to maximize both intragroup homogeneity and intergroup differences. adopting a familiar technique in empirical stratification research, 48 in keeping with the long-standing tradition in sociology that holds the occupational order to be the "backbone of the class structure" in modern societies, 50 i used the 350 or so occupational categories enumerated in the survey as the starting point of my analysis. Before performing the cluster analysis, i first grouped these into about a dozen broad categories. three different models were employed for the analysis-a basic demographic model employing income, education, and subjective class identification as the clustering criteria; 51 an occupational homogamy model measuring intermarriage rates between different occupational categories; and an intergenerational closure model measuring occupational mobility across generations. all criterion vari- 46 an excellent account of these "part-time proletarians" in taiwan is found in hill gates, Chinese Working Class Lives: Getting by in Taiwan (ithaca, n.y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); the author found that the lifestyles of workers and small proprietors were almost indistinguishable. these findings are closely echoed by studies of working-class communities in the rest of the developing world. 47 For example, hill gates, "Dependency and the Part-time Proletariat in taiwan," Modern China 5 ( July 1979). 48 For example, Doo-seung hong, "Occupation and Class: an Exploration of Class Classification by Cluster analysis," Korean Social Science Journal 16 (1990) . 49 Cluster analysis is a statistical technique for measuring the similarities between research subjects. 50 Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (new york: Praeger, 1971), 18-19. 51 that is to say, the difference between categories is measured by the difference between their average incomes, educational levels, and subjective class identifications, measured as a distance in Cartesian space. ables were standardized so as to avoid any skewness caused by scale differentials in measurement. those individuals not in the labor force and whose previous occupations could not be determined (for example, housewives, retirees) were excluded. although the demographic model produced the best-delineated social clusters (see Figure 1 for the dendrogram generated from the model), 52 some key findings are remarkably consistent across all models. Clearly, the self-employed were part of the popular sector along with industrial and service workers and farmers, while low-level whitecollar employees belonged to a stratum quite distinct from the working classes. these results are most salient when social strata are defined by their similarities in income, education, and subjective identification, but they also hold when intermarriage rates or (to a lesser extent) intergenerational mobility rates between categories are employed as the grouping criteria. For our purposes taiwanese society at the time of the transition could be clustered into six social classes. the first four are as follows:
-the bourgeoisie, which under my relatively generous definition includes all proprietors with three or more employees;
-the upper middle class, which includes professionals, managers, and educators;
-the lower middle class, which includes clerical employees and technicians; and -the working or popular classes, which include industrial and service workers, as well as the bulk of the Marxian "petite bourgeoisie," self-employed but for the most part having no employees of their own.
in addition, farmers-by and large small homesteaders-constitute a distinct social class because of their rural location and distinct mode of production. and for theoretical considerations a separate category can also be created for government personnel in light of their special relation to the state. 52 let me comment briefly on the interpretation of the dendrograms. the vertical axis measures the social distance between clusters in the Cartesian space defined by the clustering variables (for example, the three-dimensional space defined by income, education, and subjective class identity in the basic demographic model). the location of the horizontal branch connecting two clusters indicates the distance between them, which is measured-under average linkage-by the distance between the average characteristics of the two clusters. in Figure 1 , for example, the social distance between service and industrial workers is the smallest, and they are therefore clustered together. the self-employed are more similar to the industrial and service workers than any other group; they are therefore clustered together. and the distance between the popular sector (the rightmost four groups) and the cluster formed of all other groups is the greatest, and they are joined only at the top of the tree. Empirically speaking, the self-employed are differentiated from the bourgeoisie by their lower incomes and subjective class identifications and from the low-level white-collar workers by their lower educational attainments as well as by subjective identifications. in a sense, the statistical exercise merely corroborates what numerous qualitative case studies have already revealed. Readers familiar with taiwan would hardly be surprised that the factory hand and the taxicab driver and the noodle shop restaurateur are often one and the same, depending on the winds of his personal fortune. Considering the extent of the similarities, it appears entirely appropriate to locate the self-employed in the working class along with the manual workers. as hill gates observes:
53 "there is no real division between taiwan's industrious small-business people and its industrial workers, for by and large, the latter are the children of the former," and both in their daily lives identified strongly with the "poor" and "uneducated" in the social 53 1.8489 0 pecking order. Furthermore, the analysis confirms gates's speculation that in taiwan's transitional society, even routine clerical employees were a class apart from blue-collar workers. Clerical workers in our sample were closer to the upper middle class than to the working class, perhaps reflecting the fact that as recently as 1992 less than 50 percent of the adult population had earned a high school diploma. the class composition of taiwanese society at the time of the transition is presented in table 1. Considering the predominantly traditional character of the taiwanese family structure during that period, i accepted certain basic assumptions of functionalist stratification theory, assumptions which hold that individuals derive their status from the male heads of their households. 54 similarly, the ethnic identity of the individual is derived from the ethnic background of the father. the findings confirm that the prevailing perceptions of the ethnic division of labor were largely valid. While mainlanders were overrepresented in the skill-intensive sectors of the economy and were especially concentrated in state employment, the taiwanese took the lead in business and commerce and also made up the bulk of the island's popular sectors.
the class structure of political support Equipped with an empirically derived understanding of class we are ready to reexamine one of the curious puzzles of taiwanese democratization. By now the image of a heroic "new middle class," imbued with democratic values and marching at the forefront of the political opposition, has become so prevalent in the popular imagination that the casual observer may be surprised to learn of a time just before the lifting of martial law when the ruling kmt routinely justified the glacial pace of political reforms in the name of the "middle class." the mentality of the middle stratum was alleged to be "pragmatic," even conservative; and the existence of a sizable middle class was thus used to justify the government's middle-of-the-road strategy emphasizing "progress through stability." it was no mere rhetoric. in a series of six government surveys conducted between 1978 and 1985, a persistent and significant relationship was found linking higher income, education, and occupational status to support for the ruling party. the author of the final government report had every confidence that "the kmt … has won the endorsement of the majority of the middle class." nor, for that matter, was the opposition particularly adept at ingratiating itself with the middle class. although current conventional wisdom tends to see the political opposition and the various middleclass social movements that emerged during the 1980s as virtually indistinguishable, 56 careful case studies reveal a very different picture. Far from being the initiatives of veteran opposition leaders, most of these movements were led by middle-class activists who prided themselves on being apolitical problem solvers who usually preferred collaborating with regime figures with access to real power, not to mention government funds. a case in point is the environmental movement that erupted across the island in the 1980s. 57 While leaders of the movement took pains to avoid any imputations of ulterior political motives, the opposition did not help its cause by first ignoring the issue and then later-after the popular resonance of the movement had become apparent-by attempting to seize control from the top in a number of notoriously ham-fisted episodes.
Who, then, were the real heroes of taiwan's democratic transition? an answer to that question can be gleaned from two electoral surveys conducted on the eve of the transition, following islandwide legislative elections in 1983 and 1986. was a major cleavage of political support on the island (the opposition drew its support predominantly from native taiwanese, as over 90 percent of mainlanders voted for the kmt in every election), separate tabulations are also provided exclusively for the taiwanese segment of the population (table 3) . this segment will be the focus of my analysis in the remainder of this article. the results reveal a fact once well recognized by astute political watchers in taiwan if now rarely discussed in Western academic dis- Percentages for the opposition column are omitted as the vote share for the opposition at the time is known to be heavily underreported. While the reported kmt vote share is generally consistent with actual electoral results, many opposition supporters disguised their votes with "Don't Know/Don't Recall" responses. in addition, at the time the distinction between "nonpartisan" candidates and those "officially" affiliated with the Dang-wai movement/dpp was often fuzzy. according to Dang-wai veterans interviewed by the author, the public tended to regard both types of candidates as oppositionist.
course. Before the lifting of martial law the core support for the opposition came from the workers, farmers, and small-business owners of the island, whereas members of the new middle class-whether well-paid professionals or lowly "white-collar proletarians"-proved nearly as conservative as government personnel. By no means can the phenomenon be attributed strictly to the overrepresentation of mainlanders in the new middle class, as the taiwanese segment of the population exhibited almost identical patterns. the insight is certainly not lost on the opposition, and all the veteran Dang-wai leaders interviewed by the author readily acknowledged that their earliest and most loyal sup- Percentages for the opposition column are omitted as the vote share for the opposition at the time is known to be heavily underreported. While the reported kmt vote share is generally consistent with actual electoral results, many opposition supporters disguised their votes with "Don't Know/Don't Recall" responses. in addition, at the time the distinction between "nonpartisan" candidates and those "officially" affiliated with the Dang-wai movement/dpp was often fuzzy. according to Dang-wai veterans interviewed by the author, the public tended to regard both types of candidates as oppositionist.
porters had been the "black hands" of the island, so-called because their hands are soiled from manual labor. 58 herein lies the greatest strength of the opposition, for it could always depend upon a bedrock of support among the popular sectors of society, despite the array of seemingly insurmountable disadvantages facing it. Organizationally the movement was self-admittedly puny. at the end of 1986, when the regime lifted martial law, the movement, now renamed the Democratic Progressive Party (dpp), boasted only three thousand members across the island, out of a population of twenty million. 59 Party finances were practically nonexistent. as recently as 1991 the party's entire paid staff consisted of about twenty workers at its national headquarters, 60 leaving individual candidates to fend for themselves. While the kmt lavished millions on its awesome vote-buying machine, 61 opposition candidates financed shoestring campaigns with their personal savings, loans from friends and family, the sale of campaign material at election rallies, and whatever modest contributions they found in their collection boxes.
62 Outspent up to one hundred times by their rivals, opposition candidates could often offer no more than free meals and cigarettes for their campaign staffs, yet there never seemed to be a shortage of black hands happy to help. the author's sources were unanimous in indicating that their campaign workers in the pretransition era came from the grassroots, sometimes merely for a meal, but oftentimes out of personal loyalty and sympathy for the rebel cause.
likewise, it was also the black hands of the island who answered the call as the opposition played a dangerous game at the "edge of violence" in the streets, marching time and again in open defiance of martial law. newspaper reports from the period generally characterized the oppo- 62 Most former Dang-wai candidates interviewed by the author emphasized that campaign contributions were of secondary importance, in part because their needs were so modest. Opposition candidates employed almost no media advertising, and relied heavily on mass rallies to spread their message. the vast majority of contributions appear to have been quite small, often made in the form of bills and coins tossed into the back of the campaign truck. in poorer districts, donations often took the form of foodstuffs and groceries; author interviews with Zhang Junhong, yao Jiawen, huang huangxiong, and so on, taipei, taiwan, 2004. sition demonstrations as made up mainly of urban workers, and one informal survey of a dpp-led demonstration found that taxi drivers, workers, farmers, and street peddlers made up nearly two-thirds of the participants.
63 these accounts are corroborated by the arrest records at the national Police agency archives. at one major demonstration at the taipei airport in 1986, for example, thirty-four suspected demonstrators were arrested at one police roadblock. among the thirty-four were ten workers, seven taxi drivers, three peddlers, two butchers, one window installer, one surveyor, one unemployed person, and four "merchants" who included a fruit seller and a car dealer.
64 the pattern was duly noted. security officials took to ordering extended hours for local factories on dates of scheduled opposition events.
in all fairness, it should be noted that prior to 1986, opposition protests were sporadic affairs often involving no more than dozens of participants and, at most, several thousand. 65 While the numbers pale in comparison with the great "people power" movements of the Philippines and south Korea, their very emergence in normally placid taiwan shocked the regime to the core. as each breach of the taboo of martial law hewed away at the regime's myth of invincibility, the potential for even greater turmoil ahead could hardly be fathomed. in the end, the opposition did not succeed because of its organizational capacity. it succeeded despite its organizational weakness.
class grievances and opposition responses nevertheless, the patterns of political support discussed above should not come as a surprise. the economic oligarchs and bureaucratic apparatchiks of the island could hardly be expected to cast their lot with the opposition, as they owed their livelihood to the party-state. nor, for that matter, did members of the new middle class have much incentive to challenge the existing order, for they had been the prime beneficiaries of the developmental state and were looking to protect and augment their vested interests. Because a stable political and social order 63 Pan (fn. 59), 123. 64 
taiwan, Ministry of interior, national Police agency, Mei Zhu Lian Bang Fen Zi Xiao Shen Deng Jie Ying Pan Guo Fen Zi Xu Xin Liang Fan Tai
[american United Bamboo gang Member "little shen" and Others to Welcome the traitor Xu Xin-liang Back to taiwan], academia historica Catalog no. 134-2, File no. 140-2 (1986). it should be noted that the demonstration, organized in conjunction with the opposition leader Xu Xin-liang's attempted return to taiwan from exile in america, was a "purely political" event that did not involve any specific economic issues. was the most compatible with their material interests, they were wont to denounce any destabilizing "social disturbances," not so much out of fondness for the regime as out of concern for their property.
thus the most likely sources of opposition support have to be located among the popular sectors, for they had borne the price of prosperity. the success of taiwan's export-oriented development hinged upon a cheap and disciplined labor force, the only competitive advantage enjoyed by the resource-poor island. But while workers were incessantly exhorted to sacrifice short-term interests for the greater good, their long-term interests were consistently neglected by the state. Concurrent with the island's economic takeoff, real industrial wages lagged behind productivity growth through the 1970s and remained much below those in latin america. nor was welfare spending sufficiently high to provide for adequate social compensation. in the early 1980s only 29 percent of the state budget was devoted to the social services, well below the 36 percent in Mexico, 47 percent in argentina, and 55 percent in Brazil. although household income disparity appeared small by world standards, as Deyo observed, the phenomenon may reflect not so much the equitable sharing in the fruits of economic growth as very high levels of labor extraction, accomplished through the massive entry of young women from low-income families into low-wage jobs and some of the longest work hours in the world. 66 at any rate, since the late 1970s taiwan's gini coefficient had steadily increased, and as prospects of rags-to-riches glory grew ever more remote with the increasing maturity of the industrial economy, even modest increases in inequality would have been deeply felt. as decades of psychological research attests, people are notably oblivious to the Pareto Principle in making judgments of well-being: relativity appears to be the key determinant of happiness, and study after study shows that subjects preferred the more equal payoff even if it implied inferior payments for themselves than would have been forthcoming under a more unequal system. 67 it was also by far the most numerous. the government had good reasons to be wary of the mobilizational potential of labor. But despite a thirty-year head start, the ruling kmt never developed a coherent labor policy. the state-sponsored unions were first and foremost instruments of political domination and only secondarily productionist organs; they were designed more for the benefit of capital than of labor. structurally they were classic state corporatist arrangements (for example, mandatory membership, single representation with no horizontal linkage, and so on). But functionally they operated more like extensions of the party-state, with union officials down to the plant level handpicked by local kmt branches.
69 the state-run unions became widely derided as "capon unions" and enrollment rates were persistently low. nor was there much reason to enroll: a 1980 university survey of union members found that less than 10 percent expressed satisfaction with union cadres and nearly 90 percent believed that the unions were not capable of representing their opinions.
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Frustrated by their marginalization within the system, workers turned to the budding opposition in droves. to this day many labor 68 For detailed explanations of the construction of these indices, the reader is referred to yang (fn. 33). 69 all satisfaction levels given on scales of 1 to 6, with 6 being the highest level of satisfaction. Data are for native taiwanese segment of the population only. leaders claim to have been ardent supporters of the Dang-wai since its street-fighting days, and not a few credited the opposition protests as the inspiration for their own activism. 71 Especially in the heady days just before and after the lifting of martial law, workers mobbed the offices of dpp officials and flocked to legal seminars organized by opposition labor groups such as the taiwan labor legal assistance league. in 1986 a completely unknown dpp candidate defeated the kmt head of the national trade union for labor's functional representative seat in the legislative yuan.
72 as one labor activist explained, at the time workers "expected a lot from the dpp, or just about anyone with more of an anti-establishment stance."
Many of them would soon be disappointed. Even by the mid-1980s the opposition's prolabor flavor was already dissipating, and groups such as the labor legal assistance league were "on the margins of margins." in 1978 seven of the twelve planks in the Dang-wai platform were targeted explicitly at working-class concerns;
73 but by 1986 these items had largely disappeared. Even as critics heckled the opposition leadership (in true Marxist fashion) for their "inability to shed their petit-bourgeois mindset," leftists and the leftist agenda were steadily forced off the main stage, such that by the 1990s the party was virtually indistinguishable from the kmt on socioeconomic issues. What took their place was an emotional and sometimes strident nationalism, focusing in particular on the promotion of a taiwanese identity distinct from China and eventual taiwanese independence.
although subsequent events proved that the strategy had some utility, the outcome had been far from inexorable. the taiwanese nativism of the pretransition era was more nostalgic than revolutionary, more antimodern than anti-Chinese. 74 the kmt regime's assimilationist policies had in fact been more successful than events today may suggest, and Mandarin was proudly spoken as a badge of social status by many upwardly mobile taiwanese. 75 Observers at the time were impressed by the seeming dissolution of linguistic and cultural barriers. some even saw this as a basis for democratic transformation, as the growing homogeneity of the population was expected to undermine the mainlander elite's claim to political monopoly. 76 One 1986 survey found 82 percent of the population to be China oriented; 77 more conservative estimates put the figure at about 65 percent, although only about 16 percent could be said to exhibit clear taiwanese identification. 78 dpp leaders were certainly well aware of this. Zhang Jun-hong, arguably the intellectual guru of the Dang-wai movement and at one time its chief strategist, candidly admitted that before the lifting of martial law, popular support for taiwanese independence was almost nonexistent. 79 he regarded the issue as more of a kmt red herring than a serious opposition goal, a view shared by many foreign observers. 80 Of the seven Dang-wai candidates surveyed in one analysis of the 1978 campaign literature, 81 the only person to make ethnicity a major issue was annette lu, who acknowledged that the ethnic discourse of the opposition was based not on redefinitions of national identity but rather on popular representation. 82 as recently as 1989 debates were raging within the top echelons of the dpp regarding the party's future direction, with Zhang the strategist insisting that the dpp should not play up the ethnic angle, as he believed the issue would have little mainstream resonance and would only splinter the movement.
lines is a puzzle worth exploring. after all, as many scholars have observed, when ethnic and class divisions coincide, more often than not mass political mobilization takes the form of social revolution. 84 But to understand the rationale of the strategy, we must first examine the intersection of ethnic identity and class in transition-era taiwan.
the class structure of ethnic identity the shape of the intersection between class structuration and the ethnic divide does not necessarily determine the class bases of taiwanese ethnic identity. On the level of daily existence the reality of taiwanese ethnicity-and its distance from the official "national" high culture-is no more distinctive than that of many other provincial identities in China. this is not to deny the uniqueness of taiwan's historical experience or even to question the credibility of the taiwanese claim to nationhood. But it is simply a historical reality that in its unsublimated, "primordial" form, a "son of the soil" sense of identification with taiwan could also be readily subsumed as a regional identity within the kmt's brand of greater Chinese nationalism. Once again, we can reasonably assume that identification with taiwan (as distinct from identification with China) was predominantly a native taiwanese phenomenon, but beyond that the class distribution of this identity within the taiwanese segment of the population is an empirical question that can be answered only with empirical data.
to investigate this issue i employed data from Round 2.2 of the Basic Survey of Social Transformation in Taiwan (the first islandwide survey to cover the identity issue in depth), conducted in late 1991 and early 1992. although by the time of the survey the transition was well under way and discussions of taiwanese independence were no longer taboo, the ideological landscape had not yet been drastically altered and the high profile confrontations with China (for example, the 1996 Chinese missile tests around taiwanese waters) were still in the future. thus, based on these considerations as well as various other fragmentary evidences, we can be reasonably confident that the 1991-92 findings were generally reflective of taiwanese society of the previous decade.
as an indicator of taiwanese ethnic identity, i used an item asking the respondent to select "the most suitable way to label yourself." Respondents who chose to label themselves as exclusively "taiwanese" are considered to exhibit taiwanese identification, whereas those who called themselves "Chinese" or "both taiwanese and Chinese" are con-sidered to exhibit Chinese or mixed identification. in the literature on the subject self-label is generally considered a more reliable indicator of ethnic identity than attitude toward independence, since political attitudes are more sensitive to external events and practical considerations. 85 in any event, self-label has been found to be the best predictor of support for independence. 86 Focusing again exclusively on the taiwanese segment of the population, cross-tabulations were conducted against a number of socioeconomic variables. the results are presented in the following discussion.
the findings clearly demonstrate the working-class basis of taiwanese ethnic identity. Once again, while members of the upper and lower middle classes were even less likely than government personnel to exhibit taiwanese identification, workers and in particular farmers were comparatively the most likely to exhibit taiwanese ethnic identity (Figure 2) . likewise, only 12 percent of those with a junior college degree or above exhibited taiwanese identity, compared with roughly 38 percent of those with an elementary school education or less ( Figure  3) . about 20 percent of those in the top quartile of the income range exhibited taiwanese identity, compared with more than a third of those in the bottom 35 percent (table 5) . the taiwanese-identified population also scored significantly lower in Mandarin fluency (4.0 on a 10-point scale versus 6.0 for other native taiwanese), media consumption (~40 percent never read newspapers compared with only 15 percent for the others), interest in politics (23 percent never followed political news compared with 9 percent for the others), or political knowledge. it is also worth noting that contrary to contemporary speculations, the taiwanese-identified segment of the population did not exhibit especially robust democratic inclinations. Despite some misgivings about the regime, they were also more likely to agree (and less likely to disagree) that "as long as the government is taking care of public safety, traffic and the economy, whether it is democratic or not is not all that important." again, the statistical results are entirely consistent with findings from numerous ethnographic studies from the late authoritarian era, if language use is taken as an indicator of ethnic consciousness. in a fascinating islandwide study conducted in the early 1980s, van den Berg found that Mandarin had become the more frequently used lan- 
81.80%
18.20% guage in the more cosmopolitan sectors of society and was associated with upward mobility and modernization. 87 thus white-collar workers were more likely to use Mandarin-not only at work but also with their children-while laborers and peddlers were more likely to use taiwanese. More interestingly, the author found that in southern taiwan, where the population was overwhelmingly native, young males were more likely to use Mandarin; in particular, middle-class young men tended to stress their social status by using Mandarin even where 87 figure 3 ethnic identity by educational level: taiwanese only taiwanese was expected. in banks and upscale urban shops many customers who otherwise used taiwanese were observed speaking Mandarin. in fact at one department store located in a working-class area, the taiwanese-speaking sales staff often insisted on using Mandarin with their customers, as if to distinguish their store from its humbler surroundings. Mandarin was widely used as a badge of social distinction, and even individuals who typically used taiwanese at home used Mandarin when they wished to emphasize their status.
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On the whole, perceptions of disadvantage appeared to have played an important role in the psychology of those who identified as taiwanese. Whatever wrinkles there were in the distribution of ethnic identity by "objective" demographic characteristics disappeared when tabulated against subjective class identity. the proportion of respondents exhibiting taiwanese identification decreased steadily from nearly 42 percent at the lowest level of self-identification to roughly one-eighth at the highest levels (Figure 4) . similarly, the taiwanese identified also tended to perceive less political influence and lower levels of economic welfare for native taiwanese (table 6) . and while most respondents perceived moderate political disadvantages and essentially no economic disadvantages for native taiwanese vis-à-vis mainlanders, the taiwanese identified perceived the same amount of political disadvantage but far greater economic disadvantages. Whether such perceptions can be 88 ibid., 103-7. justifi ed is unclear. When asked about their perceptions of unfair treatment at work, the taiwanese identifi ed were similarly much more likely to perceive mainlander advantages. yet when queried about personal experiences of unfair treatment, there was no statistically signifi cant difference between the groups.
class, ethnicity, and the calculus of electoral politics if taiwanese ethnic consciousness was driven mainly by a generalized sense of alienation from the mainlander elite, working-class support for the opposition was likewise motivated much more by an inchoate sense of disaffection with the established order than by any self-conscious affi nity for democracy or even any systematic issue orientation. all ratings given on scale of 1 to 9, with 1 being the lowest, 9 being the highest. Ratings are for Minnan taiwanese (the predominant native group) only. individual workers may seek out opposition politicians for help with specific grievances, and there is some evidence that workers dissatisfied with labor welfare or union cadres were more likely to support the dpp.
89 But overall, working-class support for opposition and independent candidates was thought to be driven primarily by affective attitudes that were in turn determined by factors such as trust in the central government.
90 in the early 1980s many leading taiwan watchers were similarly adamant that support for the Dang-wai should not be interpreted as endorsement of the opposition's ideological agenda; rather, it merely reflected resentment against local kmt party hacks and sympathy for beleaguered opposition candidates. 91 these interpretations are generally supported by my analysis of the electoral survey data. Consider the 1983 legislative elections, for example. voters who cited "candidate qualifications" (by far the most often cited factor at ~68 percent) or "political relations" as key considerations in their vote choices were markedly more likely to support the ruling party-not surprising given the kmt's vastly superior political resources. Fewer than 30 percent of respondents cited any specific campaign issue. and in particular, although voters concerned with the opposition's twin main issues of political liberalization and the promotion of taiwanese heritage were predictably less likely to support the government, these issues were cited by only 11 percent and 7 percent of respondents, respectively. By contrast, voters citing affective factors were the most likely to vote against the kmt-about 70 percent more than nonaffective voters-and working-class voters in particular were the most likely to vote affectively, approximately 34 percent more so than middle-class voters. Of course, these findings are entirely consistent with decades of research on voting behavior from around the world. scholars of the american voter such as angus Campbell and Philip Converse, for instance, were famously pessimistic about the public's grasp of policy issues, arguing instead that mass political support was driven by partisan identifications based mainly on affect.
92 89 For example, a 1989 survey of union members found that among workers "very satisfied" with labor welfare, 48 percent supported the kmt and only 1 percent supported the dpp. among those "dissatisfied", the figures were 26 percent for the kmt and 19 percent for the dpp. see hong Xian-zheng, "Zhuan-xing she-hui Zhong nong gong Xuan Min yet the working class's lack of a conscious political agenda is fraught with consequences. as long as ordinary citizens render their support based on emotions and impressions rather than hard-headed political demands, the political elites have room to retain mass support through the adroit use of symbolic politics while gutting the policy agenda for their own ends. When i queried former dpp chairman yao Jiawen about the Dang-wai's increasing silence on socioeconomic issues of direct concern to its core supporters, he explained that since the opposition was not in a position to implement policies, it had to refrain from making specific promises lest the voters be disillusioned. Others pointed to the dispersion and high turnover rates of taiwanese industry as major obstacles to labor mobilization. all these were legitimate concerns, but a more fundamental consideration can be gleaned from the writings of Zhang Jun-hong, the dpp "party philosopher." setting out a grand vision for the opposition's road to power in 1989, eleven years before the dramatic upset that catapulted the dpp into the Presidential Palace, Zhang argued forcefully against the class politics of his left-wing comrades:
the first question one must decide is this: Do we wish to organize a minor party in permanent opposition, or a major party with ambitions to take over the reins of power? if our ambition is to be satisfied with being in opposition, then we might as well be a single-class party, a party of moral purity. But if our ambition is to construct a democratic polity with regular transfers of power, or simply to be a powerful opposition, then we must construct a broad-based, inclusive party. Minor parties can afford to have a purity fetish, but major parties must be inclusive. Revolutionary organizations can be the former, but democratic parties must be the latter to be powerful. road to power should take: if the party were ever to become competitive electorally, it had to position itself to attract, rather than alienate, potential donors in the private business sector dominated by native taiwanese. thus the party's actions should never affect the capitalists directly; the party should ally with labor and farmers only strategically and avoid creating a class-based coalition against all capitalists; when in office, the party should maintain class neutrality; when out of office, each party branch must make independent decisions with the "expansion of party power as the guiding principle for action." there was no place for "abstract, generalized stance on class politics." 95 this is the concrete political context in which the dpp's subsequent appeals to ethnic rhetoric must be understood. Class politics had to be abandoned not because "classes [did] not exist in taiwan," as some pundits maintain, but because the party's traditional class alignments were no longer conducive to its growth and expansion. yet the party could hardly expect to retain its support based on appeals to abstract principles alone, not when so much of its support was based on affect and not when political liberalization was an issue of concern to only about 10 percent of the electorate. 96 But by framing the day-to-day grievances of the popular classes in ethnic terms, the popular struggle for empowerment was recast as an ethnic struggle for "the taiwanese' day in the sun"-as the popular slogan had it-against mainlander oppression. Precisely because the party's blue-collar base was also the most deeply attached to a nativist taiwanese identity, it was also the most responsive to the party's ethnic rhetoric. and from the perspective of the taiwanese economic elite, class was an exclusive identity whereas ethnicity was an inclusive identity. the party was thus able to tap into the emotional resonance of ethnic symbols to retain its more affective traditional supporters, while simultaneously reorienting its policy platform to appeal to the native economic elites. in the world of practical politics, ethnicity trumped class for the simple reason that, at least potentially, it could deliver a larger electoral coalition. 97 in the end ethnic mobilization proved easier to sustain not because ethnicity is more real but because, as David laitin observed, its "organizational costs are low when common and powerful symbols are readily available and rules of exclusion easily formulated." 98 powerful in-group symbol turned out to be the taiwanese dialect, and what had been the badge of backwardness and shame was thus transformed into the single most powerful weapon in the opposition's repertoire. 99 thus it hardly mattered that the dpp's campaign slogans were typically vague and formulaic. in fact for a still largely symbolic opposition, that was the very secret of their success, so long as they were delivered in perfectly accented taiwanese. Conversely, in the eyes of the masses, plodding kmt ministers lugging armfuls of manila folders merely looked all the more buffoonish, when they could not understand even simple questions from opposition legislators addressing them in the local dialect.
in recent years taiwan's long quest for democracy has often been characterized as a quest for national self-determination. 100 in this view the crisis of legitimacy encountered by the kmt regime was first and foremost a crisis of national identity, and the struggle between the regime and its opponents was essentially a contest between competing nationalisms of an émigré elite from China and the natives of taiwan. But while the 1990s had indeed witnessed an upsurge of taiwanese nationalism mobilized in no small part by the dpp, most discerning observers-including many deeply sympathetic to the dpp causegenerally concur that democratization was the cause, rather than the result, of the dramatic rise in taiwanese national consciousness.
101 in this regard the taiwanese experience should be familiar to students of the Balkans and the former soviet republics: once cracks began to appear in the authoritarian regime, nationalist issues quickly became the natural choice of the political opposition (or even the incumbents) for fostering mass mobilization. in the absence of the sophisticated institutional and organizational apparatus needed for the aggregation of complex societal interests, nationalist appeals often represent the only low-cost, expeditious, and effective instrument of mobilization available.
conclusion: rethinking class, ethnicity, and the politics of transition this essay offers a counterconventional interpretation of taiwan's transition to democracy. in contrast to most existing accounts, which see democratization either as the political expression of the ascendancy of the urban middle class or the inexorable triumph of a resurgent tai- 99 For an insightful discussion on the biological basis of nationalist appeals, see gary Johnson, "the architecture of Ethnic identity," Politics and the Life Sciences 16 (september 1997). 100 For example, Wachman (fn. 23). 101 For example, lin (fn. 85).
wanese national identity, this study emphasizes the contribution of the island's urban and rural working classes to taiwan's democratization and seeks to locate ethnicity within an empirically constructed framework of class structuration. in so doing, the article aspires to draw lessons of universal relevance for the theory of democratization. the analysis reveals the political stance of the middle class to be largely situational, calculated to preserve and advance its vested interests. although the middle class has often acted as an ally of the popular sectors in the struggle for political democracy, it conceives of democracy largely in procedural terms and is therefore usually quick to retreat into the authoritarian embrace when popular demands turn to radical social redistribution. the importance of the middle class lies in its frequent role as the arbiter of regime outcomes. 102 Many times the defection of the middle class proved to be the straw that broke the junta's back. at other times-as it has been said about taiwan-the continual support of the middle class helped ensure an acceptable outcome for the ancien régime and acted as an inducement for liberalization.
For taiwan's budding opposition, popular support came primarily from the island's urban and rural working classes, as well as from the independent bourgeoisie. in retrospect support from the entrepreneurial sector was indeed valuable, for it helped ensure the survival of the movement in a relentlessly hostile political environment. But as many old Dang-wai fighters readily admitted, with the kmt regularly outspending the opposition by up to one hundred times, the battle for democracy was won at the ballot box, not the donation box. in this sense, it was the urban working class with its strength in numbers that was the bedrock of taiwan's democratic transition.
While privileging class, this study does not dispute the saliency of ethnic cleavages or the importance of ethnic mobilization. Provincial origin has been, after all, the basic organizational principle of politics since the day the first kmt troops came ashore at Keelung. yet by itself provincial origin tells only 15 percent of the story, because among the native taiwanese who made up 85 percent of the population, ethnic identity was itself a class issue, a key marker of the "otherness" of the lower strata, whereas the better-educated upper strata were far more successfully assimilated into the elite "national" culture. the phenomenon, of course, can be found everywhere from são Paulo to Kerala or even to Fujian Province on the other side of the taiwan strait.
that the opposition chose to invoke ethnicity over class was primar-ily a product of the unique correlation between class, ethnicity, and the distribution of political and economic resources in taiwanese society. Oftentimes when multiple social cleavages coincide, no identity is intrinsically more salient than another. Rather, there are circumstances when one or another identity may become the most appropriate basis for the political mobilization of one or another social group. in this sense the fact of "a critical mass of people having a strong group identification" 103 is still insufficient to explain the origins of ethnic mobilization. While value-rationality and the psychological microfoundations of ethnic identity are indeed important factors delimiting the realm of the politically feasible, ethnic mobilization as a political strategy is still governed by the calculus of instrumental rationality. this is clearly demonstrated by the taiwanese example, where the ruling kmt once enjoyed apparent ideological hegemony on issues of identity, and class-based grievances seemed at first the natural rallying point for antiregime mobilization. in the end ethnic articulations were employed because they were judged to be the most effective at maximizing the opposition's electoral prospects. But that should not obscure the very reality of class or the equally real consequences of the mode of mobilization chosen.
the conceptualization of class employed in this study, however, is one defined by the social relations of power rather than the economic relations of production, since an overly economistic construction of class may be wholly inadequate for understanding the recent wave of democratization struggles in asia. 104 While most class-based treatments of democratization have followed the traditional focus on organized labor, anyone looking for evidence of trade union involvement in taiwan would be disappointed. yet the emphasis on organized labor can be misplaced, especially when unionized workers constitute no more than an elite minority within the working class enjoying a privileged status sustained through state largesse. as noted by Bellin, one can hardly expect such "aristocratic" labor unions to assume a leading role in the push for democratization. 105 around the identities of the workplace. Many urban social movements based in poor neighborhoods, for instance, are likewise mobilized around class-related grievances, demands, and identities.
106 although usually unarticulated, members of each class do share an awareness of their station in life derived from lived experiences. this awareness may not be explicitly articulated in "class" terms, but it will involve "a conception of the differences and inequalities that divide one class from another and of the positions that they hold relative to each other." 107 in other words class politics need not be restricted to the sphere of economic production nor even centered upon instrumental concerns, because individuals do not identify themselves solely by their positions within the relations of production. Class can and does "happen" at the local temple, the neighborhood police station, or even the corner karaoke parlor, in addition to the workplace. and if we do not believe that politics is a mere subsidiary form of the "contradictions between productive forces," then there is little reason to equate the politics of class with the politics of production. in this sense, the struggles of democratization are but one manifestation of the struggles of those social classes at the peripheries of the body politic against the dominant classes entrenched in the inner sanctum of state power.
